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Introduction: Social Theory After Strathern 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“I don’t wear gloves, I like seeing things grow. I weed rather than dig, it satisfies my 
liking to have things orderly. That is, a lot of my gardening, I’m afraid, is imposing 
order…I don’t plant from seed, and I very rarely buy in plants. What I am in fact 
doing is weeding, cutting, trimming, pulling out weeds so that plants can grow, 
delighting in plants… Oh, and pruning them… Gardening is attention and 
organisation and ordering, yet what one is ordering…what one is doing, one isn’t 
changing beyond repair. On the contrary, the stuff beams back at one, grows back at 
one. And I can’t think of any other realm in which that occurs …” 
(MS in conversation with JC, this issue) 
 
Insofar as Marilyn Strathern has come to stand for a certain kind of anthropology the question 
of social theory after Strathern is by necessity also a question about anthropology's relation to 
social theory. Contemporary anthropologists bemoan its apparent lack of influence on 
adjacent disciplines. Anthropologists, it is lamented, borrow their concepts largely from 
European philosophy “and  no  one  outside  anthropology  really cares  what  we  have  to  
say  about  them.” (da Col & Graeber, 2011: x)  In the aftermath of the crisis of 
representation that dominated the discipline in the 1980s and the internal debates about and 
theorisations of reflexivity that followed, anthropologists, it is suggested, have found 
themselves in the embarrassing position of pillaging theoretical concepts from other 
disciplines to analyse their ethnographic data, as opposed to generating new theoretical 
offerings out of their materials for others to digest (Henare et al. 2006: 8). How might a 
special issue like this one, with contributions from History of Science, Philosophy, Legal 
Studies and Geography, as well as anthropology proper, move us on from such internal 
dialogues to enact a theoretically relevant anthropology after Strathern? 
 
Some anthropologists might consider such a project ill-conceived from the beginning. If 
Strathern’s influence beyond anthropology is growing (as evidenced by the editors of this 
journal commissioning a special issue in her name), her status within the discipline remains 
controversial. Various claims have been made for a ‘Strathernian anthropology’ in recent 
years. Yet the frustrations that accompany the reading of Strathern’s work are widely 
remarked upon, including accounts of the necessary relationship between her style of 
exposition and her comparative agenda (e.g. Gell 1999; Holbraad & Pedersen 2009; Reed 
2003). Despite the frequency with which Strathern’s work is today cited in academic 
publications, her texts are rarely put on a first or second year undergraduate reading list. 
Secretly, senior scholars of her own generation admit to never having read some of her most 
well-known books or to finding them incomprehensible. There is concern that those who 
expound on the benefits of reading her work are becoming increasingly dominant in the 
discipline and yet continue to speak only to a small sub-sect of it, largely those who studied at 
or who have connections to the University of Cambridge. Given that this special issue 
represents an attempt to extend the productivity of Strathern’s disruptive presence in the 
social sciences, it contains contributions from scholars extending far beyond Strathern’s own 
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students, colleagues and chosen interlocutors. The purpose of this volume is neither to 
emulate nor simply endorse a ‘Strathernian’ approach, but to explore what value a critical 
engagement with her work might have for the social sciences by setting such an engagement 
in motion. 
 
But what is a Strathernian approach? Although Strathern is widely recognised as a hugely 
significant anthropologist of her generation, it is far from apparent what her lasting legacy on 
the discipline will be. How should we gauge her influence? On the one hand, Strathern has 
extended anthropological knowledge in numerous fields of enquiry. Her comparisons of 
Melanesian and Euro-American concepts of gender, kinship, personhood and property have 
helped to redefine anthropological inquiry in both parts of the world (Strathern 1988; see 
Hirsch, this issue). Her early discussion of the implications of reproductive technologies 
forged new ground that helped revitalise the study of kinship and inspire a generation of 
social scientists working on biotechnologies (Strathern 1992a; see Franklin, this issue). By 
bringing social anxieties about technology together with an examination of the law as the site 
in which such concerns are resolved and reproduced, her recent work has developed new 
post-Durkheimian trajectories for theorising the law (Strathern 2005; see Pottage, 
Greenhouse, this issue). Her interest in the growing hegemony of transparency as a paradigm 
for managing knowledge has led social scientists to focus their attention onto the institutions 
in which they work and the creeping managerialism within academia (Strathern 2000a; see 
Lebner & Deiringer, 2008). On the other hand, what those who query the significance of 
Strathern’s legacy want to know is how her way of doing anthropology might be different and 
how this might justify the complexity of the writing. Can a clear theoretical agenda be traced 
through her diverse writings and how might this be transformative of knowledge practices 
both in anthropology and the social sciences? 
 
Strathern would probably ask us why it is felt that a relationship between social theory and 
anthropology needs to be made visible at all, and what kind of taken for granted analytical 
assumptions might generate such a problem in the first place. What is theoretical knowledge 
and how do we imagine it can travel? On the one hand, when we imagine disciplines as 
borrowing theoretical frameworks from one another this conjures up an image of social 
theory as a whole (akin to society) to which the disciplines stand as analogous parts. On the 
other hand, each discipline's own theoretical apparatus is imagined to provide a 'whole' new 
perspective on concrete social phenomena. Shifting theoretical context generates new 
knowledge. In this guise theories are thus imagined spatially as frames; organising concepts 
that can travel between disciplines in so far as they can be applied to new situations. Theories 
might be compared to one another (one set of data seen from different theoretical 
perspectives) or might be used to bring disparate things together (e.g. a Foucauldian 
conception of biopower used to illuminate medical practices in both Britain and Papua New 
Guinea). When we imagine the interdisciplinary trading of these perspectives they can also 
themselves start to take on thing-like qualities; theories become perspectives 'owned' and 
disposed of by each discipline.  
 
Is there a way of exploring the futures of anthropological thinking that both keeps the 
distinction between 'anthropology' and 'social theory' productively in play while at the same 
time seeking out models of/for the traffic between them which extends beyond familiar part-
whole thinking? In other words, can we etch out more precisely (more critically?) our 
assumptions about what exactly (anthropological) theory might be and how and where it 
might be made to travel? In particular, we suggest in this introduction that Strathern's work 
offers an array of critical techniques, taken up by the contributors to this volume, for the 
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generation of new conceptual topologies, by which we mean those spatially or arithmetically 
imagined analytic relations through which we organise knowledge, whether these take the 
form of relations between parts and wholes (Strathern 1994), the visible and invisible 
(Willerslev and Corsin Jimenez 2007), presence and absence (Law 2002) or the one and the 
multiple (Mol 2002). Reflecting on the spatiality of our concepts and how we make our 
familiar categories of analysis known to ourselves through such topologies are key 
Strathernian devices for taking anthropological reflexivity forwards. If we refocus attention 
onto the foundations of our own epistemological work might this also lead to the 
development of new ways of theorising theory for the future? We suggest that Strathern’s 
approach to gardening, described in the epigraph to this introduction, points towards a variety 
of analytic strategies for generating new topologies of subject and object, the particular and 
the general, and the concrete and the abstract. This introduction does not therefore provide a 
primer for “Strathernian theory”. Instead we review some of the original techniques that 
Strathern has used to ‘garden’ her theory: it can be used, if you like, as a conceptual toolkit. 
 
 
Differentiation 
It is conventional to think about theoretical work as the business of forming connections; 
creating new epistemic wholes out of what is already divided (whether disciplines, things, or 
persons). Social theory generates meaning by joining up a world otherwise divided into 
essentially distinct things (see also Wagner 1979). As representations these theoretical frames 
are detachable from the world they describe (Mitchell 1994; Latour 1993). Of course, the 
(post)modern experience is that one theoretical perspective, or explanation, is never enough 
to account for such 'things'. Perspectives are multiplied by conceptual shifts, by the 
impression that no one vantage point can account for an object, event, or interaction in total. 
The things described resist our exegesis, generate excess and refuse disposal (see Strathern 
1990a; 1999: Chapter 4). Entities might be related in one regard (e.g. when considered 
through the theoretical frame of a Marxist theory of labour) but fractures and differences 
subsequently appear when we consider them from another (e.g. through the frame of 
governmentality). There is always a remainder, which provokes us to further shift our 
perspective or refine our theory: hence the impulse to borrow theoretical frames from other 
disciplines. Strathern has called this way of making knowledge by considering things as 
always part of something else the merographic connection (1992b: 73). We find it useful to 
think about merographic connections topologically, as a part-whole spatial form to which 
new knowledge must conform in order to be recognisable as such.
i
 
 
Anthropologists contribute to our apprehension of merographic complexity by revealing the 
cultural diversity of responses to historical processes. Western concepts of modernity, 
individuality, or commodification, for example, are incorporated into other cultural lifeworlds 
in locally meaningful ways that in turn transform them.
ii
 In response to the ‘seemingly 
boundless unfolding of complexity’ (Schlecker and Hirsch, 2001: 70) that characterises 
merographic thinking, dialectical models of social change that pluralise abstract sociological 
constructs have come to dominate the subject area (Englund & Leach, 2001). A theory of 
‘multiple modernities’, for example (ibid.), allows for variation in the way modernity is 
enacted in everyday lives – and often involves a focus on dialectical relationships between 
‘local’ and ‘global’ forces - but maintains a continuity across those contexts in so far as they 
can all be considered a form of modernity. Such dialectical models of relationships between 
the particular and general, or the local and global, control the disciplinary impulse to multiply 
perspectives and therefore to relativise knowledge by positing meta-contexts that act as 
abstract containers for ethnographic complexity. Considered topologically, however, the 
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endless multiplication of perspectives and the containment of fragmented parts in meta-
theories do not look so different: they both entail the endless configuration of parts and 
wholes. 
 
Strathern firmly situates herself within a Euro-American epistemic culture that relies on 
merographic connections for the production of new knowledge. Rather than experiencing the 
limitations of representational knowledge as a problem that requires resolution through 
dialectical synthesis of abstract universals and cultural specificity, however, she responds by 
celebrating our capacity for conceptual division and the epistemic conditions of possibility it 
sets up. Rather than resolving difference she focuses on the moment of differentiation, or of 
bifurcation, as she puts it, itself. A commitment to the self-generating potential of bifurcation 
requires us to avoid the temptation to slot pre-existing materials into familiar categories (“this 
is traditional and this is modern”), or to think we are escaping such dualisms by exploring 
dialectical relations between them (“this is a synthesis of traditional and modern; local culture 
and global modernity”). Bifurcation instead involves dwelling in the gap between the 
“relationship of the language of description or analysis [and] the object of study” (2011:88). 
We are stuck within the epistemological confines of our language, with its history of 
associations, its conceptual clusters and discursive bundles, but when our ethnographic 
encounters make it hard to “hold certain terms steady” (ibid.) we can also seek out new 
concepts.  
 
We should be wary, Strathern suggests, of attributing to apparent resemblances concepts that 
might in fact originate from quite different ‘ideational routes’ (2011: 97). Her scepticism 
about theoretical models was born in part out of her experience in Papua New Guinea in the 
1960s and 1970s, when anthropologists' attempts to superimpose models of African lineage 
systems on Papua New Guinean kinship were faltering in the face of strong cognatic ties, 
transitory settlements and fluid relationalities (Lawrence, 1984; Wagner, 1977; Strathern, 
1994). But the limitations of representation, the reductionism inherent to any reification, and 
the immobility of our concepts are also opportunities. The hiatus of anthropological 
knowledge in Melanesia resulted in the insight that 'groups' or 'society' are anthropological 
constructions rather than pre-given entities (see also Latour, 2005;27-43). Instead, Strathern 
searched the anthropological lexicon for terms such as ‘relationality’ or ‘dividuality’ that 
might better (if still inadequately) specify the ways in which people in Melanesia imagine 
themselves as being connected and disconnected from one another, and in turn disrupt 
understandings of Euro-American sociality. The disposal of pre-existent 'wholes' opened up 
new conditions of possibility for conceptual relationships. 
 
Strathernian anthropology is slow anthropology. Her writings explicitly strive for better 
description through the repetitive differentiation and specification of terms. This strategy 
involves a constant narrowing down of language; a reduction (rather than expansion) of the 
number of the things our concepts can adequately describe. Rather than either multiplying 
contexts or generating new all-encompassing meta-theories she ‘prunes’ her contexts of 
intuitive explanations to see what concepts 'beam back', to continue the gardening metaphor. 
Indeed one might say that she revels in her awareness of the mischief such acts of 
discrimination can unleash; in the revelation of complexity at every scale (2004a). It is this 
awareness, we would argue, that matters. For this is what distinguishes the modes of 
reification that underpin acts of bifurcation from those that underpin simplistic dualisms 
(Pedersen, 2011) and what marks out Strathern’s subtle shift in conceptual topology. 
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The point is not only to develop better descriptions but to do so by making visible the 
conceptual manoeuvres by which we make the world knowable to ourselves. Consider 
Strathern’s edited work Dealing with Inequality (1987b: 2), a volume that she introduced as 
being ‘non-adjudicatory in character, non-exclusive in method. Rather than foreshadowing a 
conclusion about the prevalence of sexual inequality..., it draws attention to problems in 
anthropological practice. To regard ourselves as dealing in inequality is to make an explicit 
stand in relation to the analytical activity which here defines us: how we make known to 
ourselves that inequalities exist’ (our emphasis). Following from this, we suggest that if any 
technique is definitively Strathernian it would be an unremitting focus on how we make our 
familiar categories of analysis known to ourselves and that this might be productively made 
to form a general property of social theory after Strathern. In seeking to clarify the key 
distinction here between disciplinary approaches, Viveiros de Castro and Goldman (2009: 36) 
take Latour as a representative of sociology because in his work on fetishism (1996) the 
invocation of premodern fetish practices – brilliant as it is – is a means of clarifying how 
scientists likewise ‘also make an object to afterwards affirm that it had always existed’ (ibid: 
37). That is to say, ‘The African fetishists serve only as a point of support, as supplementary 
material that helps us respond to a question that wasn’t asked by them’. The Strathernian 
technique, however, would be quite different: 
 
Taking some notions put forth by Latour – network and hybrid, for example – the 
problem of Strathern is how to simulate what happens when these concepts cross 
Melanesian material or are crossed by them. All of this is a problem of direction and 
application: either we simply apply the concept of network to the Melanesians – this 
is the traditional procedure in anthropology – or we do what Strathern does, which is 
exactly the opposite: apply the Melanesians to the notion of the network, that is, we 
redescribe the concept of network with the help of Melanesian realities. Everything 
happens as (if she were to say) the following: ‘If Melanesians had the will and the 
patience to read Latour, what would they be able to say about it?’ (ibid: 37-8) 
 
Applying the technique of reflecting back on our own concepts is to perform (Reed, 2011: 
166) the point of view of those who are ostensibly the subjects of our description but who 
thereby end up describing us, whether those ‘subjects’ are long dead Italian physicists 
(Biagioli, this issue) or tricholoma fungal spores (Tsing, this issue). Borrowing from 
Strathern, then, is to borrow from (or exchange perspective with) the subjects of our analyses, 
deploying the lack of fit between our concepts and ‘their’ social practices as a means to 
freshen and ‘expand the anthropological concepts, not to restrict them’ (Viveiros de Castro 
and Goldman, 2009: 37). This is the case not in the romantic sense of ‘what we can learn 
from the natives’, but rather a kind of rigorous testing of the analyst’s existing conceptual 
tools. The technique presumes difference and a kind of gap, but these are not the preserve of 
anthropology so neither should be the technique. By way of example we take up the issue of 
power addressed by both Cross and ourselves in our respective contributions to this special 
issue. 
 
 
The other side of power 
A common criticism of Strathern’s work is that she does not acknowledge relationships of 
power and inequality, particularly with regard to gender (Josephides 1991; Jolly 1992) and 
historical relationships between Melanesia and the West (Thomas 1991; Knauft 1999). 
However, we suggest that within her description of Melanesian relationality can in fact be 
found an indigenous theory of power which both contrasts with and complements the focus 
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on representation and control that have come to dominate anthropological (and other) theories 
of power over the past thirty years. Indeed, The Gender of the Gift (1988) might be read as an 
account of what power relationships between men and women in Melanesian societies look 
like if we do not presume that power is always about ways of controlling or governing the 
self or others.  
 
Strathern’s reading of Melanesian sociality suggests that power might be better 
conceptualised indigenously as a capacity to ‘elicit’ or ‘extract’ actions from others. 
Concomitantly, knowledge should be considered not as a tool of governance but an effect of 
social action. By assuming the correct ‘aesthetic’ form, for example by presenting the 
appropriate gift, others are compelled to respond and in doing so provide evidence 
(knowledge) of one’s own capacities: 
 
For a body or mind to be in a position of eliciting an effect from another, to evince 
power or capability, it must manifest itself in a particular or concrete way. This then 
becomes the elicitory trigger. (Strathern, 1988: 181) 
 
Thus, in Melanesia the exercise of such power rests upon the capacity to make oneself visible 
in the correct form - often objectified in an exchange object.
iii
 When people in Mount Hagen 
put objects on display, for example, those objects are judged in terms of their aesthetic 
qualities: are they shiny, fat, the right colour? Which is to say, rather than power obtaining 
from enactment of the authoritative gaze, this is a means of arranging aesthetic criteria in 
order to make others see and respond to them. Indeed, ‘the gift consists precisely in obliging 
the partner to the exchange, in producing an effect… Melanesian knowledge practices consist 
in producing effects on other people; they thus constitute a theory of social action. Something 
different is produced by the theory of Western knowledge: it is less linked to the idea of 
effects than to the idea of representation’ (Viveiros de Castro and Goldman 2009: 31; see also 
Mol, this issue). We return in a moment to the question of (non)representation.  
 
The gift, indeed, is synonymous with appearing in the right (aesthetically compelling) form. 
Cross (this issue) notes that one radical implication of reading Strathern’s exchange theory as 
a theory of power is that power might not be exercised in a vertical direction from those who 
govern (global corporations) to those who are governed (factory labourers), but might entail a 
reverse action upwards whereby factory labourers present themselves in a form that compels 
managers to recognise them as equivalent persons; a relationship that is objectified in the 
corporate gift. Corporate giving may very well reinforce relationships of inequality by 
ideologically shaping or delimiting the forms that agency can take, but these are relationships 
that workers, nonetheless, experience themselves as actively eliciting. This is a perspective 
that is occluded when we presume that power consists only of domination. Might factory 
labourers actively seek to provoke their managers’ disciplinary tactics for the production of 
working subjectivities because those tactics also generate recognition of them as persons? 
 
We argue in our own contribution to this special issue, also on South Asia, that ‘the insistence 
in Strathern’s work on the persuasiveness of form allows us to discern more fully the 
underside of disciplinary power: its capacity to empower the subjects it produces at the same 
time as it delimits the forms of action that are possible.’ Making explicit some of the 
connections between Thrift’s (2007) important work on non-representational theory and the 
Strathernian image-that-intervenes, our aim is to draw out the affective qualities of relational 
forms. The power of south Indian portraits of politicians painted in blood, we argue, does not 
reside in their accurate representation of the subject. Instead, we draw from Strathern’s 
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meditation on Melanesian portraiture, which simultaneously presents and activates the 
relationships that have gone into the construction of the person-image. Such images, we 
argue, are interventionist rather than representational. Indian blood portraits are in important 
ways nothing like Melanesian performances or exchanges; they conform to very different 
conventions for the recognition of personhood and agency. But Strathern’s focus on the 
extractive power of the image brings into view the foundational role of relationality in their 
construction and efficacy. The blood portrait both presents an image (portrait) of a 
relationship between the person from whom blood has been drawn and the recipient and 
inflicts that relationship on the recipient. By materialising established tropes of asceticism, 
emotion and political commitment in blood portrait form a seemingly inescapable 
relationship between the artist and political leader is imaged (inflicted) in a manner that 
persuades the leader to do the artist’s bidding. Of course, tapping power by making oneself 
seen by others (in the right way) is in no simplistic way the obverse of Foucauldian power-
knowledge. We would suggest, rather, that the insight is more a complementary caution to 
the still pervasive assumption that to view (to enact the authoritative gaze) is to enact control; 
it reminds us of the other side of power.  
 
Such an emphasis on the effects of affect implicates the schemas of representation/non-
representation that we discussed earlier. Thrift, who has put issues of affect at the centre of 
questions of space, governance and power in recent years, describes affect as a kind of non-
representational, semi-conscious knowledge of our world that ‘primes us for action’ (2007: 
221). Conceived as an emergent property of relationships and encounters (between persons 
and between persons and things), affect is an apt term for describing the non-representational 
ways in which events might implicitly shape a person’s emotions, attitudes and motivations 
and compel them to act in particular ways. What the two papers discussed here do is bring 
Thrift into conversation with Strathern in order to suggest that this kind of power, or anti-
power, is frequently mobilised as a ‘weapon of the weak’. In contemporary South India, at 
least, it is a method available for those with few other options - an imaginative response to 
marginal social positions that calls forth the resources of affective (and experimentally 
relational) persuasion. In this guise, visibility does not entail building up knowledge of an 
internal self or external other but enacting a relationship and eliciting a response that will 
hopefully reveal one’s own social efficacy 
 
That such a seemingly simple insight may be of wider import is intimated by Strathern’s own 
extension of it into her subsequent work on audit cultures in United Kingdom universities, for 
practices of audit likewise determine the limited practices that will serve as evidence that 
accountability has taken place (2000: 3). A commitment to care in respect of what one makes 
visible thus both serves as the basis for Strathern's literary technique (discussed further 
below) and has provided the foundation for her critique of the accountability protocols that 
have become increasingly dominant within the academy. The primary value underpinning 
audit practices is transparency, something which the conflation of visibility and knowledge in 
modern Euro-American thinking makes it very difficult to argue with. What Strathern takes 
from Melanesian knowledge practices, however, is a realisation that total exposure is not 
necessarily the key to exercising or resisting power. Very often it is the concealment of 
objects, persons or knowledge which enables their subsequent revelation to have effects on 
others. 
 
The essays by Copeman & Street and Cross thus draw upon readings of Strathern in order to 
question built in assumptions about knowledge, representation and control in dominant 
conceptions of power-knowledge in the social sciences. The authors’ ethnographic materials 
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compel them to pause at the precise moment when conventional analytic schemas for 
theorising power in South India might come into play and explore alternative conceptual 
vocabularies. How should social theory respond? Do we pluralise concepts of power by 
engaging an analytic of ‘aesthetic coercion’ or ‘non-representational imagistic power’, just as 
anthropologists have talked about ‘multiple modernities’? Or do we maintain the surprise of 
differentiation by adopting ‘elicitation’ and ‘extraction’ as a distinct conceptual vocabulary? 
Might we even want to go further and differentiate Melanesian processes of elicitation and 
South Indian processes of affective persuasion; or distinguish between the modes of power 
unleashed in South Indian political art and labour relations respectively? New conceptual 
vocabularies are demanded at every point of bifurcation. Indeed Strathern’s decision not to 
explicitly engage with theoretical debates about power in recent years may be because the 
term is simply too burdened by its Euro-American discursive associations. Nevertheless, 
what we have sought to provide here are some notes for what a social theory of 'power' might 
look like after Strathern. What we have presented here is not a critique of Foucauldian power-
knowledge, which remains a vital and compelling means of understanding contemporary 
apparatuses of authority and control, but rather a modest proposal to attend to the ‘other side’ 
of the equation so brilliantly presented in Foucault’s work. Whether we extend existing terms 
or invent new ones, the effect of ‘capture’ by Strathern’s writings on Melanesian exchange is 
the compulsion to think beyond the concepts we have to hand. 
 
 
Comparison 
Acts of bifurcation are not motivated by a desire for complete or more extensive knowledge. 
Instead they establish unintuitive juxtapositions between newly differentiated things. These 
‘things’ are neither objects nor theories because theories in this mode of knowledge 
production remain firmly attached to their objects (see also Henare et al. 2006). A concept of 
elicitation, for example, emerges out of and remains embedded in acts of exchange in 
Melanesia. It cannot simply be lifted out of those acts, objects, relationships and applied to 
others, although its juxtaposition with sanguinary politics in India might reveal the latter’s 
affective qualities, just as the juxtaposition with exchange relations in Indian factories might 
provoke us to reflect again on the ways in which Melanesian processes of elicitation might be 
considered a kind of power. But if we cannot separate theory and data what are we left with? 
What is theory if it cannot be abstracted and moved? We suspect that Strathern would argue 
that we are left with comparison itself. 
 
Strathern's comparisons are enacted by shifts sideways rather than laid out to view from an 
external (theoretical) viewpoint. As Holbraad and Pederson have described, this makes the 
author herself somewhat elusive (2009). She appears to move with her materials. As we have 
described, rather than generating a general theory that encompasses two or more things in a 
relation of similarity, Strathern “cuts away what we think is shared” (Holbraad & Pedersen, 
2009: 390) to create “disjunctive” (Lazar, 2012), “inappropriate” (Tsing, this issue) or 
“asymmetrical” (Pottage, 2001) comparisons between concepts that remain attached to their 
things. 
 
Sideways movements do not necessarily take place on a single plane. Disjunctive 
comparisons can leap across what look like scalar differences. As Tsing points out (this issue) 
twentieth-century anthropology progressed by way of a growing critique of comparison 
between similar units, with its echoes of a colonial gaze: “by making things comparable all 
the interesting questions had already been squashed. This was one of our defenses of 
ethnography: good ethnography, we thought, refused comparison”. For Strathern, however, 
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comparison does not depend upon similarity – neither the object analysed nor the theoretical 
frame used to analyse it need to remain stable. Instead she works to ‘recombine knowledge 
originating elsewhere’ (Edwards & Petrovic-Steger, 2011:3) by drawing on Melanesian 
funeral statues to illuminate intellectual property law (2005) or ceremonial exchange to 
explore the implications of biotechnology (1999). Correspondingly, the objectification of the 
concept of elicitation in Melanesian ceremonial exchange gives rise to our understanding of 
blood portraits as objectifications of affective power. But this does not mean to say they are 
the same. Here the reifications generated from bifurcation become the basis for ‘usefully 
shocking analogies’ (Tsing, this issue). The intended effect of these juxtapositions is surprise: 
a momentary apprehension of the grounds of our own and other's world making. Very often, 
this surprise also tells us something about the limitations of our own knowledge producing 
tools. As Tsing writes in respect of her comparison of kinship relations amongst persons and 
fungal spores, “Often it is the very incompatibility of the units being compared that 
illuminates the relationship between tools and research objects.” 
 
As Hirsch describes in his contribution to this special issue, analogic comparison largely 
takes two forms in Strathern's work: analogies she establishes between Melanesian societies 
and those she draws between Melanesian and Euro-American modes of symbolic action. Her 
comparisons between Melanesia and Euro-America, he argues, emphasise the limitations of 
the analogy; they are ‘negative strategies’ (Strathern 1990b). As we point out in our own 
essay, however,  ‘negative analogy is only able to have persuasive force (extend) because of 
the retained (conserved) positive analogy.’ Analogic limits, Hirsch suggests, have been 
especially important for Strathern in thinking about how western technologies and institutions 
such as Intellectual Property Law travel to places, such as Papua New Guinea, where the 
cultural conventions that underpin them do not hold. It is those comparative limits that 
challenge us to produce new concepts. 
 
In drawing on Strathern's account of gift giving in Papua New Guinea to illuminate his own 
description of corporate gifts in South India, Cross, like Strathern, emphasises “the very 
many points on which we might draw parallels in order to heighten those where we cannot” 
(Strathern, 2005:109). Strathern's work in Papua New Guinea makes visible certain 
preconceptions that have driven previous social analysis of corporate giving. In this case, it 
seems, conceptions that were prefigured by the self-descriptions of the corporations 
themselves. Like Melanesians, workers in the South Indian diamond company where Cross 
carried out research see gift exchange as a moment of extraction and as a moment of 
revelation of knowledge about themselves and their relationships. But this is not to say the 
concepts of personhood and relatedness being operationalised are the same. The limit of the 
analogy is precisely where the element of surprise, and thus the possibility of new knowledge 
(bifurcation), emerges. As Tsing puts it (this issue): “The point of a Strathernian comparison 
is thus to show the limits—and possibilities—of forms of knowledge making, even as it sheds 
light on the situations and objects forced awkwardly into comparison.” 
 
If Cross, Copeman and Street and Hirsch explore the limits of analogies Tsing (this issue) 
takes kinship to the limit. Tsing extends Strathern's awkward comparisons into the world of 
tricholoma fungi that merge with trees, mate with their parents and become their own 
offspring. The fungi, like Strathern’s Melanesian, Tsing argues, can offer a critically reflexive 
view on our tools for knowing action and agency. They are neither individuals nor groups but 
‘continuous, indeterminately growing interactive trajectories, adapting to changing 
conditions’. And yet, Tsing suggests, the fungi might not be as different from humans as we 
assume when we presume such inter-species comparisons to be impossible. ‘Indeed 
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reimagining ourselves as interactive trajectories goes a long way to getting us started thinking 
about how we act together with other species to make the world’. In the words of another 
ethnographer of ‘companion species’, Haraway; 
 
Strathern… taught us why conceiving of “nature” and “culture” as either polar 
opposites or universal categories is foolish. An ethnographer of relational categories 
she showed how to think in other topologies. Instead of opposites, we get the whole 
sketchpad of the modern geometrician’s fevered brain with which to draw 
relationality (Haraway 2003:8).  
 
In the world of fungi, even comparison between species as pre-given categories falls apart. 
Matsutake mushrooms, according to the scientists who study them, are so dynamically 
amorphous that it is difficult to decipher where one species begins and another ends. As in 
Strathern's writings on Melanesia, parts, wholes, and therefore comparable units, dissolve. As 
Tsing demonstrates, analogies might be traced here across the relational practices of humans 
and fungi, or across the knowledge practices of anthropologists and scientists. Just as 
anthropologists in Melanesia who tried to make social relations fit into African segmentary 
kinship models were forced to think beyond the established understandings of society, so do 
the scientists trying to fit fungi into classes and categories need to remain open to surprise. 
 
 
Analogy/invention 
If Strathern’s comparisons between Melanesia and Euro-America emphasise the partial 
character of analogy, Hirsch (this issue) points out that her comparisons within Melanesia 
emphasise the extension of analogies. This is a less remarked on feature of Strathern’s 
comparative method but we suggest it is critical to the potential contribution of her work to 
wider social theory. Hirsch notes the similarity to Lévi-Strauss’s technique in his 
Mythologiques (1964-1971). If in his classic multi-volume study Lévi-Strauss ‘shows how all 
of the myths he analyses from the contiguous North and South America – over 800 – are all 
versions or transformations of one another’, Strathern similarly argues that Melanesian 
societies can be understood as versions of one other; ‘they share a common aesthetic’ (1988: 
340).
iv
 The way in which persons and actions are made known and apprehended are the same. 
Cultural conventions cannot be compared across these societies (e.g. different cultural 
conceptions of gender) because one reified set of conventions is re-iterated in events and 
interactions distributed across the region. Melanesians, she argues, take for granted the 
aesthetic form (gender) in which they must appear in order to be recognised, but they must 
realise themselves in this form – for example through participation in processes of initiation, 
reproduction or gardening - in order to have social effects. If, in Melanesia, Strathern 
emphasises the extensive quality of analogy (the reproduction of conventions in concrete 
form) this is because this is where Melanesians themselves focus their efforts. 
 
Delineating cultural conventions and shared conceptualisations is the traditional preserve of 
anthropologists. Robbins has argued that this orientation towards convention has given rise to 
continuity thinking in anthropology (Robbins, 2007). While Papua New Guineans might 
convert to Christianity, for example, we like to emphasise the continuity of traditional 
cultural concepts and traditions in this new religious domain (ibid.). Continuity thinking thus 
dominates dialectical approaches to social change: we acknowledge the ways in which 
cultural conventions are altered in relation to new influences but we tend to emphasise the 
continuity side of the analogy; the way in which those influences are themselves incorporated 
into established cultural repertoires. The insight Strathern draws from her observations in 
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Melanesia is that scholars are not the only ones ‘making’ analogies. Twentieth-century 
anthropological analogic work involved producing representations that showed the 
connections between different domains of society. By contrast anthropologists of Melanesia 
have noted people’s attempts to ‘knock the conventional off balance’ by intentionally 
innovating upon it (Wagner, 1975). When young male Fuyuge speakers in the Papuan 
Highlands innovate on established conventions for their ceremonial dance form, Gab, 
through the modern repertoire of disco the anticipated power of the display comes from the 
appropriate revelation of convention in a new visceral form (Hirsch, 2001). We might 
consider such performances as analogic interventions; they extend and innovate on 
conventions for interpersonal effect rather than construct them through conceptual 
connection. Similarly, in our contribution to this volume, we discuss the ways in which an 
Indian social activist’s blood portraits of political leaders enact an analogy between the blood 
shed in and of a subjugated nation (Tibet) and the artist’s blood shed ‘for peace’. It is the 
enactment of this analogy in concrete form that makes it aesthetically persuasive. Thus, 
neither are scholars the only ones constructing conceptual topologies. The part conserved (the 
formal nature of blood being shed in each case) throws into relief the part that is extended 
(blood shed for purposes of peace, not subjugation). Such juxtapositions thus take the form of 
an analogic intervention, since their purpose and effect is to stimulate action/response. 
Analogy, skilfully rendered, mobilises its internal topology to produce effects in the world.
v
  
 
If anthropologists have tended to emphasise continuity by producing conceptual analogies, 
Strathern draws attention to the ways in which analogies might be enacted in practice. This is 
where anthropology’s duplex tool of the conceptual-interpersonal relation is important. 
Strathern identifies the anthropologist’s duplex technique of keeping both the interpersonal 
and conceptual in view at the same time as central to its processes of knowledge production 
(2005). When we talk about kinship we talk about both the ways in which people interact 
with one another and the ways in which particular concepts of relatedness are immanent in 
those interactions. Enacting relationships in practice analogically extends the conventions 
implicit in those practices. Conversely, as Edwards and Petrovic-Steger (2011) point out, 
conceptual work also extends and works upon our personal relationships. 
 
Greenhouse’s essay in this issue considers international law in the light of Strathern’s concept 
of the duplex. The result is a ‘conundrum’: ‘the fact of plural legalities invites a conceptual 
rendering of culture, while the fact of cultural pluralism invites an instrumental rendering of 
law’ (Greenhouse, this issue). The result is another duplex: law/culture. For Greenhouse the 
law/culture duplex is ‘a dialectic missing its third element’, or ‘something else to think with’: 
this missing something is anthropology. If anthropology activates interpersonal relations in 
order to generate epistemological reflections about culture, the law engages such 
relationships as categories. For that reason anthropology tends to apprehend the law as a 
purely instrumental institution, whereas, as we have mentioned, Greenhouse follows 
Strathern in suggesting that we ought to treat law as at least as epistemic as anthropology. 
With culture covertly present, then, ‘human rights prosecutions seem to give back to 
anthropology a nightmare version of its own concepts’ (this issue). Yet all the while 
anthropology is kept separate, and treats human rights (being law) as pragmatic. So far as the 
relation between law and anthropology is concerned, it seems that each conceals those 
aspects of the other that they nevertheless contain. But other ‘lines of flight’ are possible: law 
and culture might be ‘released’ from one another to take ‘flight across unexpected 
properties’. The result would be surprises consequent on productive bifurcation. 
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Alongside analogic limitations or extensions, Franklin, in her essay in this issue, is interested 
in the way in which “analogies return”. That is, the way in which a context that is borrowed 
from in order to extend meaning in another context might itself become transformed by that 
symbolic act. If Darwin borrowed metaphors of kinship to make evolutionary models of 
nature palatable in the nineteenth-century, today our ideas of kinship are being transformed 
by developments in the new genetics. The significance of analogic return becomes 
particularly apparent in the context of reproductive technologies, where scientific practices 
both seek to imitate nature and “travel back” to make nature “like technology”. As Biagioli 
points out following Strathern (this issue), “Metaphors can migrate, mix, and both open and 
eclipse the possibility of certain associations in different scenarios, but they can also be read 
in different directions. Going from son to father has different effects than going from father to 
son, though the relation is still between the same two entities.” 
 
Biagioli’s essay in this issue offers a tantalizing counterpart to Franklin's paper by comparing 
the way printing press technologies complicated relations between author and work in 
eighteenth-century property law, when it gave rise to the modern notion of copyright, with 
IVF technology's complication of legal relations between parents and children in the 1990s. 
Just as, before the printing press, evidence for authorship lay in the delivery of a piece of 
work, rather than its content or form, so, prior to IVF, did legal notions of motherhood rest on 
her delivery of the child: “Mothers and authors were defined by the fact that they materially 
delivered children and works from themselves.” Delivery was sufficient evidence of 
authorship/parentage in and of itself. While the printing press rendered production 
inconclusive as evidence of conception so IVF “rendered delivery inconclusive to the 
definition of mother.” Both technologies push the origins of creativity back in time from the 
point of delivery to the point of conception or “intention”. Here, we also have an analogy that 
returns: 
 
Metaphors of fathers generating works helped the articulation of modern notions of 
intellectual creativity, which were then fed back, a few centuries later, into the 
conceptualization of new forms of reproductive creativity… 
 
People often talk about technologies as catalysts for change. One of Strathern's contributions 
to these discussions has been the insight that while technology frequently upsets basic 
dualisms between nature and culture, it can also be a driver for their reproduction in new 
forms (1992a). In other words, through the notion of the duplex, technology is neither 
simplistically considered to materialise either convention or invention. Instead, we could say, 
technologies are analogy machines; they “invent” conventions in new forms. 
 
 
Surprise 
In her essay in this special issue, Mol traces the uses of the Dutch word lekker through 
different practices in Dutch care homes, internet forums, and academic papers. The article is 
in part a response to Strathern’s comments on an earlier piece by Mol about the possibility of 
comparing not only conceptual schemes but practices of ‘cutting’ across time and space. 
There Strathern asked how Mol could decide all those practices were ‘about’ cutting at all. In 
other words, was Mol not still conceptually pre-determining her material? Mol’s response is 
‘to trace socio-material practices and semiotic specificities together’ (this issue). Crucially, 
the word lekker does not only describe states of bodily pleasure or appreciation; its utterance 
may itself be constitutive of those states. Revisiting the classic nature/culture divide that 
preoccupied (especially feminist) anthropologists in the 1970s and 80s, Mol suggests that it 
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remains the case that when such a division is being made ‘bodies get situated on the nature 
side and language belongs to culture’. But the bodies present in scenes of lekker, principally 
in Dutch care homes, ‘are not pre-linguistic vestiges that elude verbal disciplining’. Rather, 
‘flesh and talk jointly participate in a practice… [A]sking is het lekker?…is not sensible, but 
sensual. It is a verbal variant of caressing’; that is to say, the word does ‘not just frame 
pleasure, [but] generate[s] it’. Moreover, inspired by the merographic relation as elaborated 
by Strathern, Mol follows ‘trails’ of lekker in its complicated multifacetedness as a means of 
circumventing part-whole topographies of social description. Proceeding from this, Mol, in 
‘activist mode’, not only follows lekker as it moves but makes it move by inserting it into the 
English language and into contexts where it might contain the capacity to surprise, thereby 
creating the possibility of a new concept, something that incorporates and goes beyond all the 
notions of niceness, naughtiness, tastiness that any single translation would give us: ‘I try to 
shift lekker around. From nursing home wards to managerial meetings and Ministries. From 
mundane practices in the Netherlands to academic texts written in English. How far can you 
go?’  
 
Mol’s analysis has no explanatory endpoint as such. Lekker is never contained by theory. 
There are only endless shifts sideways; comparisons without comparative frameworks. How 
else, then, might we dispose of excess meaning (the language is Strathern's) if not by 
exhausting interpretation through hyper-contextualisation; by laying out in clear view all the 
possible meanings we might attach to the image, event or artefact? This, of course, is 
precisely what Strathern resists. The image or event will always yield up more meanings for 
disposal (Strathern, 1999: 60). Why do we desire to “finish” explanation at all? Instead, in 
juxtaposing Euro-American and Melanesian knowledge practices, Strathern borrows 
something of the Hagener's techniques for generating effects. Rather than comparing Euro-
American and Melanesian practices from an external position that renders them equivalently 
'cultural', she moves through a series of unfolding images in analogic sequence (e.g. New 
Ireland Malanggan followed by British patents; Minj compensation payments by European 
Intellectual Property Rights). The technique is one of selective revelation. Strathern thus 
gives us images to unravel images. Of course the intention, in contrast to that which lies 
behind figurative writing, is a kind of explanation. But, crucially, in order for that explanation 
to register as surprise in the mind of the reader not everything need be made visible at once.  
 
This technique appears to rely on the eclipsing of the author herself. A recent survey of 
scholarly reviews of The Gender of the Gift showed how they highlighted the theme of 
authorial disguise (Crook, 2007). They refer to ways in which ‘the method’s ornamentation 
“camouflages her position.” For [Mary] Douglas too, Strathern “manages not to have 
authored any criticisms herself”… [Margaret] Jolly suggested that “[w]hat emerges is not 
realist fiction but a compelling series of picaresque stories that seem in search of an author. 
Just as the individual is expunged in the analysis of Melanesian personhood, so the author 
eludes us”’ (ibid.). Her comparisons are enacted by shifts sideways, and this is precisely a 
means of avoiding an externalist ‘bird’s eye view’; indeed, it would seem that authorial 
elusiveness is ‘a constitutive feature of what comparison amounts to in her work’ (Holbraad 
& Pedersen, 2009: 372). As Crook (2007) points out, the effect produced is one where ‘the 
author appears to have disguised herself in order to let the methods first be seen for 
themselves’. Just like, perhaps, the modest gardener who recedes from view once their 
flowerbeds begin to bloom.  
 
Surprise, Strathern argues, is generated by the ethnographic moment - when the time of 
observation meets the time of analysis. Anthropology's distinctiveness does not therefore lie 
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in ethnographic fieldwork methods but in the relationship between fieldwork and writing. 
This, she suggests, is where its contribution to social theory might lie. Strathern's 
paradigmatic image of the ethnographer glimpsing two men rushing a pole strung with pearl 
shells over the brow of a hill in Highlands Papua New Guinea is nicely complemented by 
Cross's own image in this volume of corporate managers presenting gold coins to labourers in 
a hotel marriage hall in South India. These are moments that the analysts cannot shake from 
their mind, and that continue to generate surprise as they are revisited in the light of new 
materials. They are images that refuse exhaustion. 
 
What might the ethnographic moment mean outside anthropology? How can the element of 
surprise that is central to Strathern's account of the ethnographic moment be recreated 
through different disciplinary knowledge practices? The materials that the contributors 
consider in the papers that follow are not necessarily ethnographic in the conventional sense 
(exemplified here by the contributions of Cross and Copeman and Street). They might 
comprise legal papers (Pottage), historical sources (Biagioli), anthropology's own archive 
(Greenhouse) or even the anthropologist's imagination (Tsing). Nonetheless, the notion of 
immersement does not seem misplaced, insofar as immersement can be taken to mean a kind 
of dwelling; a momentary suspension (and simultaneous anticipation) of analysis so that 
anything can be observed, a ‘deep hesitation’ (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2009: 387). In other 
words, the ethnographic moment moves us away from the comparison of tangible objects and 
intangible analytic constructs in order to compare instead the moments or movements that 
make up the knowledge production endeavour. The contributors each dwell in their materials; 
they seek out further complications, problems, and distinctions that destabilise the 
unexamined conventions of Euro-American thinking of Euro-American thinking. With a little 
bit of gardening, we can still be surprised by what such writings throw up. 
 
 
Echoes 
We have argued that central to Strathern’s focus on analogy is the idea that through the 
repetition and reproduction of concepts in everyday interactions we both conserve and extend 
their meaning. This makes Strathern acutely aware of the historicity of ideas: 
 
I would draw an analogy. In the same way as one might wish to comprehend 
capitalist organisation as it developed historically in Europe, so one needs to inject a 
real history into our comprehension of Melanesian gift economies. The history itself 
may be unrecoverable, but we surely know enough about historical process to 
recognize a series of connected events. (1988: 34) 
 
Strathern’s recent work examining the metaphoric extension of post-enlightenment kinship 
thinking as it has historically shifted between domains in Euro-American culture (2005) 
might thus be read as a counterpart to her pan-Melanesian ethnography. Perhaps one of the 
reasons that Strathern has nonetheless been accused of cultural essentialism and a-historicism 
is that she does not herself attend to the mechanisms of repetition.
vi
 Instead, as the above 
quotation reveals, her identification of ‘analogies that extend’ presumes that those historical 
relations exist without making them explicit. When Strathern follows concepts of personhood 
through Melanesian or Euro-American institutions and practices, then, she is presuming that 
real historical relations underpin those continuities. Rather than comparing whole cultures or 
societies she compares historically emergent concepts as they are crystallised in particular 
social practices and interactions. The connections between these interactions do not add up to 
bounded wholes. 
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One of Strathern’s major contributions to anthropology has thus been to demonstrate the 
ways in which ‘echoes’ of biological thinking – ‘a primal distinction between biological 
process on one hand and social constructs on the other’ (Strathern, this issue) – can be traced 
across all levels of social and cultural life. This way of mobilising the work of analogy has 
implications for the role of anthropology in the social sciences. When asked by Janet Carsten 
(this issue) how anthropologists can contribute to public debates about new reproductive 
technologies, Strathern answered with a critique of cultural diversity. The problem with 
assuming that the anthropologist’s role is to make cultural variation visible is that this 
position is also a political one; it feeds into contemporary ideologies about individual choice. 
By contrast, “the other contribution that anthropologists can make,” she argues, “is to point 
out the ramifications and consequences of what seem to be individual decisions, but that in 
fact do have repercussions.” When we act we reproduce ideas and convey them to others: 
“People’s actions have consequences not only on those…. with whom they are in immediate 
contact, but they have what one might say are, so to speak, counter-consequences, that is, 
they raise possibilities and those ideas then become part of the repertoire with which 
everyone thinks”. (It is such counter consequences Mol is seeking to actively create, perhaps, 
when she inserts ‘lekker’ into the English language). 
 
Echo, we suggest, is an important feature of Strathernian analogy. A reverberating echo does 
not entail the presence of a single abstractable principle held constant across different 
contexts but a trail of enactments and utterances that repeat
vii
 and transform one other. When 
Hirsch compares analogies that extend to analogies with limits, he is not returning, therefore, 
to a distinction between similarity (within cultures) and difference (between cultures). 
Concepts are conserved through repetition, but it would be a mistake to presume that those 
concepts lie ‘behind’ or prior to the interactions. Instead Hirsch points to the ease with which 
shared conceptualisations traverse social domains in some places and bifurcate in others. 
Whether and how concepts travel through institutions, persons and technologies is always an 
empirical question. Here, then, is another version of how ideas or concepts travel. Not as 
overarching frameworks that momentarily and partially encompass their materials, but as 
ideas that are already embedded in practices, and which are subsequently borrowed, echoed, 
and translated as they are taken up by others. Might we have another model of knowledge 
exchange for the social sciences here? What ideational routes might anthropology share with 
other social sciences, or be actively created for the future through critical engagement with 
Strathern’s work?  
 
Legal theorist Pottage’s essay in this special issue – an exemplary exchange of perspectives 
between anthropology and law – models one such route. Discerning echoes between 
Strathern’s treatment of law as a knowledge practice and early Roman law's conception of 
law as object as described by the historian Yan Thomas, Pottage suggests that these shared 
conceptualisations provide the basis for a theorisation of the law within legal studies that 
would depart from established understandings of the law as an instrumnent of society. What 
he argues is that legal technique can be understood as a process by which things and persons 
are connected in ways that are recognisable within the confines of law itself - that are able to 
act as effective legal objects within the courtroom. In Roman law, for example, the implicit 
conventions governing the recognition of legal knowledge, what Strathern might refer to as 
the “aesthetics” of law, do not require the appearance of intentional criminal actors but the 
appearance of typified actions to which persons might be attached. In Roman law there was 
no separate, abstract, domain of society that gave actions their meaning or purpose. Actions 
were things: “objects and endpoints are not found in nature, ready to be discerned and acted 
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upon by law through the exercise of cognitive and practical reason, but are instead immanent 
in the legal operations and transactions that act upon them.” Pottage's point is that while 
modern law might describe itself and its objects in very different ways, it might nonetheless 
still be understood as a series of aesthetic operations by which lawyers attempt to create 
recognisable legal objects. From this perspective society may not be an external context or 
force that law enacts in practice but an object “immanent within law, and that is constituted  
by legal technique.” There is, then, a double engagement here with Strathern: in addition to 
drawing on Strathern’s specific insights concerning legal form, what Pottage enacts and 
extends so skilfully is a Strathernian technique of analogical enquiry. Invoking Thomas’ 
conceptualisation of the ‘formularity’ of Roman law as something that ‘was not a vehicle for 
anything other than itself’, Pottage is able to draw a contrast with anthropological 
understandings of law, as a means of excavating and re-examining the postulates of 
anthropological categories of analysis, but also as a means to enact a conversation (between 
anthropology and law) by way of the analogy. This is where the technique comes into its 
own: through both drawing the analogy between the different disciplinary understandings and 
locating specific usages of analogy within them, the article provides a prototype of the kind 
of ‘post-plural comparison’ (Holbraad and Pedersen 2009) that might characterize theory 
after Strathern.  
 
Discarding familiar theoretical containers may take the form of rediscovering the earlier 
echos of concepts that still resound today – retooled, so to speak, via their reimagining in a 
relational way, as potential transacting partners for the illumination of the present (Riles, 
2011: 32). This is what we find in Greenhouse’s contribution to this special issue, which re-
presents the conceptual beginnings of what became the anthropology of law as a means of 
shedding new light on contemporary issues - the relation between culture and law, between 
human rights and anthropology. In particular Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society 
and Malinowski’s Crime and Custom in Savage Society are treated as resources for regaining 
a critical perspective on the way law is able to both foresee and contain the social, the cultural 
and anthropology. The question addressed by Malinowski was whether the Trobriand 
Islanders, who had nothing empirically definable as law (i.e. no jural or legislative 
institutions as such, nor even a definite category law), could nonetheless be said to have it. 
Durkheim, on the other hand, wondered whether law, as something that is otherwise hidden, 
might be considered the force that ‘makes solidarity visible by symbolizing the collective 
conscience’ (Greenhouse, this issue). Greenhouse questions the main reception traditions of 
these works, finding overlooked subtleties in each of their arguments that would require 
recognition of a ‘secret sympathy’ between their respective contributions. Malinowski’s very 
use of the term ‘law’ registered the influence of Durkheim, while, if for Durkheim criminal 
sanctions ‘make the “collective conscience” visible’, for Malinowski, law amounted to ‘the 
visibility of social structure’ (ibid). Critically, following Durkheim, Malinowski reframes 
‘law through social science as an interpretive and critical project that bears directly on the 
moral self-legitimation of contemporary states’. And, if both seek to ‘somehow take into 
account local cultures’ (ibid), as in settings and accounts of legal pluralism and disputes over 
human rights, there is also an instrumentalism common to each. Through their 
complementary re-reading of anthropology and Roman Law, Greenhouse and Pottage both 
make law visible as a simultaneously instrumental and epistemological project. Thought 
together with Strathern, their projects might provide a model for considering the ‘culturality 
of law’, and for complicating the prevalent anthropological characterisation of law as 
reducible to pragmatism. Greenhouse’s recourse to progenitors of the anthropology of law is 
poetic, for as she notes elsewhere (2009: 113), ‘figuration[s] from classic social 
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anthropology’ constitute ‘a repertoire always nearby in Strathern’s narratives of her own 
reasoning’. 
 
In this special issue, then, we can follow the translations and mediations of Strathern's ideas 
as they are reproduced in concrete form (academic papers). But the collection does not 
amount to a new 'social theory' on a different order from the relationship between text and 
reader that it facilitates. We can talk about Strathernian theory or Foucauldian theory, but we 
only ever really have those theoretical formulations as they are being enacted, in the texts that 
we write. The contributors therefore seek to take social theory forward through the genre of 
'response' (Riles, 2006) rather than epistemic encompassment. That is, to explore the analogic 
connections or disruptions that people discover between her ethnographic expositions and the 
enduring, niggling questions that have framed and motivated their own academic careers.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘My maternal grandmother had a wicked sense of humour and I like to think she has 
passed it on to me’. 
(MS in conversation with Alan Macfarlane, 2009) 
 
 
Strathern has articulated some of the dangers of thinking that we can move knowledge across 
disciplines. The risk is that, when interdisciplinarity is invoked as a sign for creativity or 
accountability it becomes its own yardstick, without attention to the specificity of the 
knowledge practices in play (2004b: 39). In particular, when disciplines come to stand in for 
a distinct perspective (e.g. for the cultural as opposed to the economic, or the social as 
opposed to the scientific), each viewpoint is presented as complete in itself. Knowledge is 
already in place (ibid.: 5). It is available for management but not for critical engagement 
(2006). Management involves casting (always) unfinished disciplinary debates aside in order 
to facilitate the trade and mixture of useful knowledge. Strathern contrasts the 
interdisciplinary attempt to subordinate differences to unified outcomes to the disciplinary 
work of creating disagreement and divisions 'as points of growth' (2006: 199). Here, what 
Strathern calls criticism is crucial: 'the aim of criticism in research is to re-multiply, re-divide, 
the outcomes of any one particular argument.... Criticism bifurcates; it makes a single 
account multiple again' (ibid.). If we look for intellectual value in the interdisciplinary 
encounter, she suggests, neither the image of benign tolerance of parallel perspectives, nor 
that of trade
viii
 may offer suitable guides. 
 
And yet Strathern might herself be considered an exemplary practitioner of 
interdisciplinarity. Her interests in bioethics and audit cultures, for example, have led her to 
engage with the work of social scientists working across the humanities and social sciences. 
Rather than despair of the new fashion for interdisciplinarity Strathern provides us with a 
'research model' for what it might look like (2006). She finds hope in the idea that criticism 
may not depend on pre-specified undivided or divided origins. Instead we can look to the 
moments in which differences become an active concern. Differences opened up in the course 
of interaction, that are established by the contrasting problems people have, might provide the 
potential for critical engagement and argument rather than anodyne agreement. As Kelly puts 
it (2011: 72), ‘Strathern’s use of “analogic reasoning” (1991, 2005a, 2007) reveals how one 
might build connections between different empirical accounts of the world while preserving 
their distinct epistemic integrities’. Akin to the anthropologist's immersement in the 
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relationships and concerns of those they study, this engagement takes the form of a 
willingness to 'be captured by someone else’s work... Critics find themselves drawn – 
precisely by their own interest – into other people’s agendas… To argue with an idea is to be 
captured by it’ (2006: 203, punctuation removed).  The uncertainty of the encounter, the lack 
of pre-specified interests and goals, generates the on-going potential for newly articulated 
distinctions and arguments. Capture, she suggests, simultaneously involves the marking out 
of new positions. This explicit commitment to surprise as an affective property of analytic 
differentiation, we argue, is a distinguishing feature of Strathern's methodological toolkit.  
As we have sought to illustrate in this introduction, bifurcated concepts are not suspended at a 
remove from the material they are ‘cut’ out of (Strathern 2011; cf. Holbraad & Pedersen 
2009). They are not frames. They can only move through, in, and as the materials they bring 
into relation. The important point for us is that such alternative conceptual topologies set up 
the possibility for different kinds of exchanges between the social sciences. Acts of 
bifurcation are not peculiar to anthropology, although the distinctions between self and other, 
interaction and analysis that are opened up in the ethnographic encounter (the 
anthropologist’s use of concrete relationships to access abstract relationships [Strathern, 
2005]) might make anthropologists peculiarly sensitive to them. It is this goal of creating new 
concepts by discarding our familiar theoretical containers that the contributors to this special 
issue have sought to borrow from Strathern. 
 
We have suggested that such strategies find a parallel in Strathern’s approach to gardening. 
As Strathern notes (interview with Carsten, this issue), gardening both involves generating 
order and being open to surprise. Gardeners never know until it has bloomed exactly how 
their garden will turn out. Rather than buying in new plants, Strathern returns again and again 
to old ethnographic images from her past fieldwork, or texts that have already been made 
available by other authors. The point of ‘replanting’ such texts in her own writings is that 
they generate new ethnographic moments. By pruning them back, taking cuttings and 
creating new juxtapositions, revealing hidden analogies between them, these ‘old’ moments 
are able to grow again in new, unpredictable directions. Given the ‘traditional’ role of the 
anthropologist as provider of context and upholder of ‘the social’, her ‘abstensive’ cutting 
away of the “‘thingy” mass’ of context as the condition of a mode of comparison that reveals 
‘uncommon denominators’ (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2009: 382) and her suggestion that the 
concept of society is theoretically obsolete (see Strathern, 1996b) betrays the confidence of a 
gardener well practiced with her secateurs. In this sense Strathern’s texts, like the perennial 
garden, do not have summed up end points but generate new conceptual shoots and 
connections.  
Gardens, like Strathern’s writings, tend not to directly or obviously reflect their authors – the 
gardener herself tends to be a rather hidden presence. The good English garden is one that 
demonstrates the capacity of the gardener to tame the natural world at the same time as giving 
nature enough leeway to ‘beam back’ so that the garden does not appear simply as a 
reproduction of a template and has some unique, particular, and enchanting quality.
ix
 The 
surprising qualities of the garden are experienced as the effect of an external force; the forest 
that creeps back and resists our efforts at control. We order gardens, prune plants, arrange 
flowers, water lawns but gardens grow themselves.  
Gardening, in the English sense, involves the control and transformation of nature in line with 
aesthetic cultural conventions (flower beds and borders, lawns, flowers and foliage). If 
Strathern’s writings might be considered as gardens, then Strathern appears to revel in the 
deployment of exactly these kinds of conventions. The analytic techniques she draws on are 
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well established: analogies, images, comparisons, echos. But she is possibly disingenuous in 
her claim to be entirely Euro-American (merographic) in her approach to 
gardening/knowledge production. Unlike the quintessential English gardener, whose efforts 
are focused on control of their materials and who experiences nature as a surprise that grows 
back at one, Strathern’s precise choreographed control of her materials seems intentionally 
oriented to the generation of surprise. This can be seen, for example, in the almost excessive 
‘pruning’ of her ethnographic images in order to excise familiar similarities and to reveal 
unintuitive analogies. In other words, her control of her materials appears to go so far as to 
actively seek unpredictable effects. In this, we suggest, her approach to knowledge 
production borrows techniques from the Melanesian gardeners she so often invokes.  
Daribi gardeners from Papua New Guinea do not simply seek to control their gardens through 
a domestic division of gardening labour (Wagner, 1975). Such gardens would be considered 
mundane and unimpressive; they would turn out how everyone might expect. Instead the 
Daribi gardener must use magic spells that enable the gardener to borrow and channel power 
from other domains, such as the raking and nesting capacities of the bushfowl, in order to 
‘make his work more effective’ (ibid.: 63), and to create a garden that is uniquely generative 
(in terms of the food it produces and relations with kin that it furthers). Garia gardeners from 
another region of Papua New Guinea (Lawrence, 1984), meanwhile, whisper the secret 
names of spirits into their seedlings in a bid to ‘tap’ those spirits’ powers and make them 
grow. In other words, Melanesian gardeners actively seek to elicit, through their relationships 
with one another, spirits and animal worlds, the unique, surprising effects that English 
gardeners attribute to the external forces of nature.  
Strathern’s texts appear to borrow from these more ‘magical’ gardening techniques. Just as 
Daribi gardeners ‘borrow’ from bushfowl, so Strathern explicitly borrows from old 
ethnographic material, other persons’ texts and pre-existing resources, to re-enchant contexts 
(such as kinship) that had come to appear analytically moribund. If she lacks complete 
control over her plants (other people’s ethnographic descriptions, her own ethnographic 
memories, newspaper reports) it is because they have come from elsewhere. Her texts unfurl 
and bloom. They do not symbolise or represent social relations (as for example English 
gardens have been taken to reflect the social class structure), but impress them on the reader 
through the revelatory staging of analogies, just as a Daribi gardener might hope their 
harvested garden generates knowledge (of their capacities) in those who eat from it. 
Strathern has often claimed to make jokes in her work (2009; 2010b; personal 
communication) but for those struggling to follow the logic of exposition they might have 
been hard to spot. We suggest that the joke here takes a quintessentially ‘implicit’ English 
form. It might be found not in the content of her work but in its form; in her earnest 
commitment to Euro-American scholarly convention at the same time as she reveals the 
grounds of such convention as artifice. The result is the obviation of figure and ground. Her 
techniques simultaneously order and elicit conceptual growth. In the spirit of her own 
enquiries, then, this special issue – in anticipation of future analytical relationships - seeks to 
make incomplete an entity already there.
x
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i
 On part-whole relations as a knowledge form see Strathern (1994; 2004a). 
ii
 See, for example, the work of Jean and John Comaroff (1992) on dialectical approaches to 
anthropology and history.   
iii
 Munro (2005) has similarly noticed the implicit theorisation of coercion in aspects of 
Strathern’s enquiries.  
iv
 Several scholars have pointed out interesting correspondences between the oeuvres of Lévi-
Strauss and Strathern (see, for instance, Gell 1999; Viveiros de Castro & Goldman 2009). 
v
 Copeman (2009) therefore employs the term ‘catalytic analogies’.  
vi
 See especially the work of Thomas (1991) and more recently the overview by Scott (2007). 
 
viii
 In this respect Strathern offers a critique of Galison’s ‘trading zones’ between scientists, 
which might, she suggests, be a useful model for interdisciplinary problem solving but is not 
a catch-all for knowledge production. 
ix
 As Gell has pointed out, ‘enchantment’ is a by-product of our apprehension of artworks or 
technologies as appearing beyond human capacity and as containing external, magical 
qualities (Gell, 1992).  
x
 The reference here is to Strathern’s 1993 essay ‘Making incomplete’ (in particular, p. 48).  
